Senin, 21 Maret 2016

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Libel law, EU law and the ECHR: A Comment on Arlewin v. Sweden




Athanassios Takis: PhD, Special Adviser to General Secretariat of Greek government

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 March 2016 in the case of Arlewin v. Sweden concerns the (mis)application of EU Regulation 44/2001 (which determines which Member State’s courts have jurisdiction over civil and commercial cases) on behalf of the Swedish courts and illuminates the limits of the ‘acte clair’ doctrine (the principle that final national courts do not always have to send questions about EU law to the CJEU).

The Arlewin judgment

The facts of the Arlewin case, which gave the ECHR the chance to decide on an issue concerning the application of EU law have as follows: The applicant, Raja Arlewin, is a Swedish national, a self-employed businessman, who attempted to bring private prosecution proceedings and a claim for damages for gross defamation against X. X is a Swedish national, the Chief Executive Officer of a television company and anchor-man of a popular show in which Mr. Arlewin was accused of, among other things, involvement in organised crime in the media and advertising sectors. The television programme had been produced in Sweden, in the Swedish language and was sponsored by Swedish advertisers. The programme was sent from Sweden via satellite to a London-based company (Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd), which broadcast and transmitted it to viewers in Sweden.

In a preliminary ruling the Stockholm District Court declined jurisdiction over Mr. Arlewin’s claims because the programme had not originated from Sweden. The court applied the relevant Swedish law, mainly the Constitutional law on freedom of expression, and followed the case law of the Swedish Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that Mr. Arlewin had not established that the decisions concerning the content of the programme had been taken in Sweden, a fact which was a prerequisite for the jurisdiction of Swedish courts. It contested that the defamation claim should be decided by the courts of the United Kingdom where the seat of the company transmitting the programme is.

Mr. Arlewin appealed, alleging that the Swedish courts’ position ran counter to EU law and specifically to the Brussels I Regulation (44/2001), as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Regulation establishes the principle that in cases relating to liability for wrongful acts, jurisdiction is to be exercised by the courts of the place where the harmful event had occurred and, according to Mr. Arlewin, in his case the harmful effects of his defamation had occurred in Sweden. He also requested that a question concerning the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation be referred by the national court to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The Swedish Supreme Court rejected Mr. Arlewin’s referral request, finding no reason to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU, and rejected the case.

Since Mr. Arlewin was not satisfied with this, he brought an application against the Kingdom of Sweden before the ECtHR claiming that he had been deprived of effective access to court and that the State had failed to provide him with sufficient protection against allegations that violated his right to privacy. In its judgment of 1 March 2016 the ECtHR notes that the core issue in this case is whether the Swedish State violated the applicant’s rights through the courts’ decisions to dismiss the defamation suit on grounds of admissibility. The Court examined the relevance to Mr Arlewin’s case of two instruments adopted within the framework of the European Union, namely the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive (2010/13) and the Brussels I Regulation.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the Audiovisual Media Services Directive determined the country of jurisdiction when an individual initiated a defamation claim. In particular the Directive. More precisely Article 28, which addresses the situation where a person’s reputation and good name have been damaged in a programme, sets out only the right of reply; it does not deal with defamation proceedings or a related claim for damages. The Court therefore considered that the Audiovisual Media Services Directive did not regulate the matter of jurisdiction when it came to defamation proceedings arising out of the content of a transborder programme service.

Rather, jurisdiction under EU law was regulated solely by the Brussels I Regulation. Under Articles 2 and 5 of that Regulation, it appears prima facie that both the United Kingdom and Sweden had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Mr. Arlewin’s case. On the one hand, X is domiciled in Sweden, and, on the other, Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd is registered, and thus domiciled, in the United Kingdom (Article 2 gives jurisdiction to the country of domicile of the defendant). Furthermore, Article 5 gives jurisdiction to the place where the harmful event occurred, and it could be argued that the harmful event had occurred in both countries, as the television programme had been broadcast from the United Kingdom and the alleged injury to Mr. Arlewin’s reputation and privacy had manifested itself in Sweden. The programme had been produced in Sweden in the Swedish language, was backed by Swedish advertisers, was to be shown live to an exclusively Swedish audience, while the alleged harm to Mr. Arlewin’s reputation had occurred in Sweden. With the exception of the technical detail of satellite reception transmission, the facts of the case were entirely Swedish in nature.

Therefore, the Court noted that the content, production and broadcasting of the television programme as well as its implications had very strong connections to Sweden and very little to the United Kingdom. Under those circumstances the Swedish State had an obligation under Article 6 of the Convention to provide Mr. Arlewin with an effective right of access to court. The Swedish courts’ interpretation of both the Swedish and the EU law had led to a situation where the alleged victim of the defamation could not hold anyone responsible under Swedish law and could only find his way to a court in the UK. Requiring Mr. Arlewin to take proceedings before the UK courts could not be said to have been an equally viable and reasonable alternative, as far as the practical and economic obstacles to initiate proceedings abroad would render the remedy inefficient. The Swedish courts, by dismissing Mr. Arlewin’s action without examination of the merits and by referring to the alternative of initiating proceedings in another country, had impaired the very essence of his right of access to court and consequently breached Article 6 of the ECHR.

Comment

This is an ECHR judgment which directly examines the application of the EU acquis by the Member States’ courts and indirectly touches upon the issue of these courts’ obligation to apply for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU. As far as the first matter is concerned, the ECtHR clarifies the scope ratione materiae of the EU's Audio-visual Media Services Directive as not regulating every issue of substance and jurisdiction that may arise in relation to the broadcast of a television programme. The Directive only regulates a person’s right to reply to claims concerning him or her and not his or her right to initiate civil or criminal proceedings before national courts for his or her defamation.

The Court further addresses the issue of the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation and their impact on the right to a fair trial. In underlining the importance of the systematization of solutions ensured by the Regulation and the criterion of ‘strong connections’ of a dispute to a country as a jurisdictional basis (article 5 paragraph 3 of the Regulation), the judgment affirms that in general the Regulation observes the right to a fair trial and draws a fair balance between diverging interests. The special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort establishes the jurisdiction of the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur (locus damni) and constitutes a comprehensive derogation from the main rule set in Article 2. 

The ratio of this provision rests on the indissoluble ties between the component parts of liability with the evidence and of the conduct of the proceedings and the causal connection between the damage and the event from which that damage originates. That is why litigation before an alternate forum abroad would be too burdensome for the applicant and a violation of his right to enjoy practical and effective access to a court. The Court of Strasbourg relies upon the findings of the Luxembourg Court and reaffirms the existence of a direct dialogue between the two jurisdictions, with the first affirming the findings of the second in a noteworthy manifestation of its endeavour to choose -whenever possible- an interpretation of the ECHR that facilitates the proper application of EU law by national authorities.

As for the second issue at hand, namely the obligation to address a question to the CJEU, the Court doesn’t explicitly address this issue. However, it seems rather apparent that had the Swedish courts applied for a preliminary ruling, the CJEU would have affirmed that the referring courts were competent to examine the defamation claims of Mr. Arlewin by virtue of Article 5 paragraph 3 of the Brussels I Regulation. This is clearly the outcome of the CJEU judgments cited and of the paragraphs 36-39 of the ECtHR judgment concluding that ‘Brussels I Regulation requires EU Member States to make their courts available if jurisdiction is confirmed, [as] the ECJ noted in Kongress AgenturHagen GmbH v. Zeehaghe BV that the Regulation does not govern matters of procedure. This means that a court can reject a case for reasons relating to domestic procedural rules as long as the national procedural law does not impair the effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation’.

However, the Swedish courts applied the Brussels I Regulation in a manner inconsistent with EU law and in considering the jurisdictional provisions to be an acte clair, rejected the request of the applicant. According to Article 267 of the TFEU, when questions on the interpretation or validity of EU law are raised in a case pending before a court of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court is required to bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union and apply for a preliminary ruling. The CJEU in the Cilfit and Others case has established three limited exceptions to this rule. Under the third of these exceptions, a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy doesn’t have to apply to CJEU for a preliminary ruling when it is convinced that no doubt arises as the meaning or the validity of the law to be applied is clear and unequivocal (acte clair) and therefore, immediately comprehensible.

A court or tribunal adjudicating at last instance may take the view that, although the lower courts have interpreted a provision of EU law in a particular way, the interpretation that it proposes to give of that provision, which is different from the interpretation espoused by the lower courts, is so obvious that there is no reasonable doubt as to its meaning. The Court has also made clear that the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular difficulties to which the interpretation of the latter gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (see judgments in Intermodal Transports, para 33, and in João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, para 39, and discussion here and here). 

However, the Court in the latter judgment found that, in cases where a question of EU law has given rise to a great deal of uncertainty on the part of many national courts, the courts of last instance should deem themselves obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice. A persistent uncertainty strongly indicates not only that there are difficulties of interpretation, but also that there is a real risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union. Should a failure on behalf of the national court to observe this duty imposed by Article 267 TFEU cause damages to individuals (see Köbler), the Member States should either set aside the court’s decision or, where this is impossible due to the principle of res judicata, compensate the individual for infringement enacted by the court of last instance of its EU law obligation (João Filipe Ferreira, para 60).

The relationship between the refusal to request a preliminary ruling and the violation of the right to a fair trial has been the subject of two other important judgments delivered by the ECtHR. At the same time, a third application is still pending (Repcevirág Szövetkezet v. Hungary, Application no. 70750/14 vii Application no. 17120/09). In the case of Dhahbi v. Italy the Court said that refusing a request for a preliminary ruling, while providing no reasoning at all for the refusal, constitutes a breach of Article 6 ECHR. In the more recent judgment of 21 July 2015 in the case of Schipani and others v. Italy (discussed here), the Italian Cour de cassation did not make any reference whatsoever to whether the issue at hand was an acte clair and therefore, justified an exemption from the rule that renders the preliminary reference obligatory for the last instance courts. According to the ECtHR ‘it is therefore not clear from the reasoning of the impugned judgment whether that question was considered not to be relevant or to relate to a provision which was clear or had already been interpreted by the CJEU, or whether it was simply ignored’. The Court of Strasbourg again reached the conclusion that the applicants’ right to a fair trial had been breached.

Examining the cases of Dhahbi, Schipani and Arlewin of the ECtHR and João Filipe Ferreira of the CJEU together, indicates that the Courts of Luxembourg and Strasbourg have restricted the criteria of the application of the doctrine of acte clair. The national courts have to accurately reason their decisions not to apply for a preliminary ruling based on their unequivocal understanding of the EU law. The combination of the Arlewin and João Filipe Ferreira judgments shows that a breach of EU law resulting from the misapplication by the highest national courts of Article 267 TFEU may entail the responsibility of the Member State to compensate the individuals at the same time for both their material damages (a EU law consequence in line with the Francovich and Köbler rulings) and their non-pecuniary damages (a ECtHR consequence in line with the Arlewin judgment).

Barnard & Peers: chapter 9, chapter 10

Photo credit: legalthrillernovels.com

Jumat, 18 Maret 2016

The final EU/Turkey refugee deal: a legal assessment



Steve Peers

The EU and Turkey have now reached an agreement on refugee issues, which has aroused considerable legal and political controversy. To examine the arguments about the deal, I present here the main text with my legal assessment of each point annotated. This builds upon my comments (together with Emanuela Roman) first of all in general on the relevant points last month, and then secondly on the leaked draft text of the final deal earlier this week (I have reused here some of the latter analysis where relevant). The agreement should be read alongside the EU summit conclusions, as well as the Commission communication on the deal. It incorporates the March 7 EU/Turkey statement which addressed the same issues in less detail.

The text of the deal is underlined below. The sections in bold have been added during negotiations, and the sections in strike-out have been removed. I have already discussed the legal status of the deal in the prior post earlier this week: it’s a statement that is not subject to approval or legal challenge as such; but its implementation in the form of specific laws or their application to individual asylum-seekers can be challenged.

1.       All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full compliance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order, Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be processed indvidually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum ProceduresDirective 2013/32/EU, in cooperation with UNHCR. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey, Turkey and Greece, assisted by EU institutions and agencies, will take the necessary steps and agree any necessary bilateral arrangements, including the presence of Turkish officials on Greek islands and Greek officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016, to ensure liaison and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of these arrangements. The costs of the return operations of irregular migrants will be covered by the EU. Migrants having been returned to Turkey will be protected in accordance with the international standards concerning the treatment of refugees and respecting the principle of non-refoulement.


The newly added first sentence is a flagrant breach of EU and international law – but the rest of the paragraph then completely contradicts it. To be frank, anyone with a legal qualification who signed off on this first sentence should hang their head in shame. Returning ‘all’ persons who cross from Turkey to the Greek islands would contradict the ban on collective expulsion in the EU Charter and the ECHR, as well as EU asylum legislation. However, it does appear from the rest of the paragraph – including the newly added reference to non-refoulement (not sending people back to unsafe countries) – that this is not really the intention.

As for the rest of point 1, the first question is how ‘temporary’ this arrangement will be. Secondly, point 1 makes clear that the EU’s asylum procedure directive will apply to those who reach the Greek islands, as legally required. Note that the text does not refer to Greek waters: but the Directive explicitly applies to them too. It does not apply to international or Turkish waters. It is not clear what is planned as regards those intercepted before they reach the Greek islands.

As for ‘migrants not applying for asylum’ the crucial question is whether they will be given an effective opportunity to apply for asylum, as the Directive (and ECHR case law) requires. If an irregular migrant does not apply for asylum then in principle there is no legal obstacle to returning them to Turkey, subject to the conditions set out in the EU’s Returns Directive. Note that the Greek authorities will have to consider the applications, which is a significant administrative burden; this implicitly reiterates the closure of the route via the Western Balkans. The EU’s decisions on relocation of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy (discussed here) will implicitly continue to apply, but they only commit to relocating a minority of those who arrive in Greece, and they are barely being applied in practice.  

If an application is ‘unfounded’ that means it has been rejected on the merits. If it is ‘inadmissible’ that means it has not been rejected on the merits, but on the grounds that Turkey is either a ‘first country of asylum’ or ‘safe third country’ (there are other grounds for inadmissibility, but they wouldn’t be relevant). The Commission paper briefly suggests that Turkey could be a ‘first country of asylum’ (for more analysis on that, see the prior blog post). Most of the debate is on whether Turkey is a ‘safe third country’.

Is it? The commitments on treatment in Turkey have been moved from this statement to the separate summit conclusions. Treatment in Turkey will need to match EU rules in the procedures Directive, which define a ‘safe third country’ as a country where: the people concerned do not have their life or liberty threatened on ground of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (this test is taken from the Geneva Convention on refugee status); there is ‘no risk of serious harm’ in the sense of the EU definition of subsidiary protection (death penalty, torture et al, civilian risk in wartime); the people concerned won’t be sent to another country which is unsafe (the non-refoulement rule, referring specifically to the Geneva Convention, plus the ban on removal to face torture et al as laid down by ECHR case law); and ‘the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’.

As set out in the previous blog post, the last point is questionable because Turkey does not apply the Geneva Convention to non-Europeans, and the best interpretation of this requirement is that it must do so in order for the clause to apply. However, this interpretation is not universally shared: the Commission, the Council, Greece and some academics take the view that it is sufficient that Turkey applies equivalent standards in practice. (Note that the Commission only selectively quotes the Directive to make this argument). Even if this latter interpretation is correct, whether Turkey does apply equivalent standards in practice might itself be open to question.

Furthermore, again as discussed in the previous post, many NGOs argue that refugees are not always safe from mistreatment in Turkey itself, although no one argues that all of them are mistreated there.  Equally Turkey allegedly returns some people (but clearly not all of them) to unsafe countries, and the deal explicitly plans for a ‘safe zone’ in Syria.  Such a zone is conceivable in theory, but whether it would indeed be safe would have to be judged when and if it happens; and it may become less (or more) safe in light of events. To address these issues the procedures Directive says that the asylum-seeker must be able to argue that ‘the third country is not safe in his or her particular circumstances’. Everything will then turn on the assessment of an argument along these lines.

A critical here is whether the case can be fast-tracked. The procedures Directive contains lists of cases where the administrative procedure can be fast-tracked, and where the appeal against a negative decision to a court doesn’t automatically entitle an asylum-seeker to stay. Note that those lists don’t refer to fast-tracking ‘safe third country’ cases, although in practice it may be quicker to decide a case without examining the merits. It is possibly arguable that the lists aren’t exhaustive. If Greece wants to take this view, the interpretation of these clauses will be crucial. If the cases can’t be fast-tracked, it will obviously take longer to return people to Turkey in practice. Member States can set up special ‘border procedures’, but there is no reference to fast-tracking applications in this context. Furthermore, Member States can’t apply fast-track or border procedures to ‘vulnerable’ applicants, as broadly defined, and can’t apply border procedures to unaccompanied minors.

Odd as it might seem, the general state of human rights in Turkey (for example, as regards freedom of expression) is not directly legally relevant to returning refugees or other migrants there. The question is whether Turkey is unsafe, as defined in EU asylum law, for refugees and migrants. However, the general state of human rights in Turkey is relevant for a different reason: the Commission has separately proposed that Turkey be designated a ‘safe country of origin’, so that any refugee claims by Turkish citizens can be more easily rejected. I argued last September that this proposal was untenable in light of the human rights record of Turkey. In light of developments since, I’ll update my assessment: the suggestion is now utterly preposterous. But this proposal is not part of the deal.


2.    For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. A mechanism will be established, with the assistance of the Commission, EU agencies and other Member States, as well as the UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be implemented as from the same day the returns start. On resettlement based on 1-for-l principle: a) Priority will be given to migrantsSyrians who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly, On the EU side, resettlement under this mechanism will take place, in the first instance, by honouring the commitments taken by Member States in the conclusions of Representatives of the Governments of Member States meeting within the Council on 22/7/2015, of which 18.000 places for resettlement remain. Any further need for resettlement will be carried out through a similar voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54.000 persons. The Members of the European Council welcome the Commission's intention to propose an amendment to the within the limits and in accordance with the distribution set out in [relocation decision of 22/9/2015 to allow for any resettlement commitment undertaken in the framework of this arrangement to be offset from non-allocated places under the decision. - non-allocated places]. Should these arrangements not meet the objective of ending the irregular migration and the number of returns come close to the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be reviewed. Should the number of returns exceed the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be discontinued. the number of returns exceed the numbers provided for by these commitments, this agreement will be subject to review.

The idea of a ‘1-for-1’ swap of irregular migrants for resettled Syrians has been controversial, but does not raise legal issues as such. Resettlement of people who need protection from the countries they have fled to is common in practice, but is not a binding legal obligation under international or EU law. The legality of return of people to Turkey has to be judged separately (as discussed above) from the question of whatever trade-offs might be made in return for this. However, I certainly share the view of those who find a de facto ‘trade in human misery’ morally dubious. The ethos of resettlement is humanitarian; to demand a pay-off for one’s humanitarian actions contradicts their ethical foundations.

The final text makes clear that resettlement will focus on the most vulnerable people. Note that if all resettlement from now on takes place from Turkey, then no-one will be resettled by the EU from Lebanon and Jordan, which also host large numbers of Syrian refugees. On the ‘low priority’ cases, it is open to Member States to prioritise resettlement on whatever criteria they like. Obviously the intention here is to deter people from attempting unsafe journeys via smugglers; whether that would work depends on the numbers who might be resettled.

Overall, the EU has not increased the numbers of people that Member States are willing to accept: the first 18,000 are the remainder of the 23,000 people that the EU committed to resettle from non-EU countries last year, and the next 54,000 are the remainder of those who were going to be relocated from Hungary, before that state rejected the idea last September. However, unlike the mandatory quotas under the EU’s relocation decision, these numbers will be voluntary. The final deal makes clear that the maximum member of people who will be returned on this basis is 72,000: this part of the deal ends once the number of returned irregular migrants hits that number, or if the levels of irregular migration stop. In the latter case, the EU will move to a voluntary humanitarian admission scheme, discussed below. In the former case, it is not clear what will happen.

3)   Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from up out of Turkey and into to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect.

This refers to Bulgarian concerns that people might try to cross the Black Sea as a new entry route. Of course, if people do make to Bulgarian territory or waters, the EU asylum laws would apply, as they do for Greece.

4)   Once theirregular crossings between Turkey and the EU have come to an end are ending, or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced, the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to this scheme.

This scheme is set out in a Commission Recommendation from December, as discussed in detail here. Note that the text was amended to make clear that irregular crossings would not have to stop entirely; that was an obvious fantasy.

5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met. To this end Turkey will take the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements to allow the Commission to make, following the required assessment of compliance with the benchmarks, an appropriate proposal by the end of April on the basis of which the European Parliament and the Council can make a final decision.

This commitment is transposed from the March 7 statement. The waiver of short-term visas only applies to the Schengen States, and applies for stays of three months. Under the EU/Turkey readmission agreement, Turkey will have to take back anyone who overstays. It will still be necessary for Turkey to meet the relevant criteria, and for the EU Council (by qualified majority vote) and the European Parliament to approve this change in EU law.

6)   The EU, in close cooperation with and Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of additional further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, Furthermore, the EU will mobilise decide on additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018. [X] billion for the period [Y] for the Turkey Refugee Facility.

The amount and timing of additional money from the EU and its Member States was agreed during negotiations. Details of the timing of disbursements and the nature of the spending projects have also been added. Note that this money is not, as is widely assumed, simply handed over to Turkey: legally speaking it can only be spent on projects that assist the Syrian refugee population. The Commission paper sets out further details of how the money will be spent, starting with a contract to provide food aid to over 700,000 Syrians.

7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing  work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.
This refers to an intention to extend the existing customs union to cover services and investment issues.
8) The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession process as set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015. They welcomed the opening of Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during the Netherlands presidency. They welcomed that the Commission will put forward a proposal to this effect in April. Preparatory work for the opening of other Chapters will continue at an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member States' positions in accordance with the existing rules.
Ultimately the EU and Turkey agreed to open only one new chapter out of 35 which need to be agreed in order for Turkey to join the EU. Only one chapter has been closed so far in a decade of negotiation. There is no commitment to open or close any further chapters. Even if an accession deal is ever negotiated, there are many legal and political obstacles in the way of it being approved, as all Member States’ parliaments would have to agree.
9) The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be more safe.
This refers to an intention (as noted above) to create a ‘safe zone’ within Syria. Whether this is viable or not remains to be seen. If there is any dispute about its safety, then returning Syrians to Turkey would be problematic if Turkey intends to send them further on to the alleged safe zone.


Conclusions

Overall the final deal tries to address the two main legal concerns about the March 7 ‘deal’. It makes clear that the EU asylum laws will apply to those who reach Greece (subject to the caveat about what happens to those intercepted in Greek waters), and that Turkey will have to meet the relevant standards when taking people back. The intention to ‘make the deal legal’ is clearly undermined by the extraordinary statement that ‘all’ irregular migrants will be returned. The key legal question will be how these commitments are implemented in practice.

The main legal route to challenging what happens should be by asylum-seekers through the Greek courts. Those courts could refer questions to the CJEU about EU asylum law (the CJEU could fast-track its replies). Alternatively if the asylum-seekers have gone through the entire Greek court system, or cannot effectively access the Greek system they could complain to the European Court of Human Rights (which is separate from the EU), and claim that there is a breach of the European Convention of Human Rights. In practice, however, it may be that access to lawyers and courts is more theoretical than real.

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the EU did not try to ensure beyond doubt that the deal was legal, by putting in place some sort of effective monitoring of Turkish commitments as regards the treatment of refugees and migrants, in particular asking Turkey to fully apply the Geneva Convention to all refugees as a condition of the deal. After all, the EU will now be meeting a significant proportion of the costs of housing refugees in that country. It is even more disturbing that some Member States want to arrange for expedited returns to Libya. Surely before too long, the CJEU will asked to interpret the definition of ‘safe third country’ in EU asylum law. That finding will be crucial in determining whether it really is legal to return people to Serbia, Turkey, Libya and possibly other countries besides.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26
JHA4: chapter I:5

Photo credit: www.parapolitika.gr

Rabu, 16 Maret 2016

Data retention and national law: whatever the CJEU rules, data retention may still survive!




Matthew White, Ph.D candidate, Sheffield Hallam University


Should governments be able to retain data on everyone’s use of the Internet and their phones – because it might arguably aid the fight against terrorism and serious crime? This ‘data retention’ issue raises fundamental questions about the balance between privacy and security, at both national and EU level. Initially, in the electronic privacy (e-Privacy) Directive, EU legislation set out an option for Member States to adopt data retention rules, as a derogation from the normal rule of confidentiality of communications in that Directive. Subsequently, in 2006, at the urging of the UK government in particular, the EU went a step further. It adopted the Data Retention Directive (DRD), which requiredtelecom and Internet access providers to keep data on all use of the Internet and phones in case law enforcement authorities requested it.

However, on 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the latter Directive went too far. In its Digital Rights Irelandjudgment (discussed here), that Court said that the EU’s Data Retention Directive (DRD) was invalid in light of a lack of compliance with the rights to privacy and data protection set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (para 69 and 73). This left open an important question: what happens to nationaldata retention laws? Can they also be challenged for breach of the EU Charter rights, on the grounds that they are linked to EU law (the derogation in the e-Privacy Directive)? If so, do the standards in the Digital Rights Ireland judgment apply by analogy?

Instead of addressing this matter urgently, the United Kingdom government sat on its hands for a while and then unprecedentedly rushed through the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014). DRIPA 2014 was intended to be a reactionto the Digital Rights Ireland ruling, giving the UK as a matter of nationallaw the power to retain data that had been struck down by the CJEU as a matter of EU law.

In 2015, Tom Watson (now the deputy leader of the UK Labour Party), David Davis (a Conservative party backbencher) and others challenged s.1 of DRIPA 2014 arguing that the powers to obligate data retention on public telecommunication operators set out in that section of DRIPA did not sufficiently reflect what the CJEU ruled in Digital Rights Ireland. Although that CJEU ruling only applied to EU legislation, they argued that it also applied by analogy to national legislation on data retention, since such legislation fell within the scope of the option to retain communications data set out in the derogation in the e-Privacy Directive, and so was linked to EU law (and therefore covered by the Charter). Even though the e-Privacy Directive only related to publicly available electronic communications services (Article 3(1)), it is submitted that any extension of the definition of public telecommunications operator would fall within the Data Protection Directive, and thus the CFR would still apply. The High Court (HC) ruled in the claimants’ favour in Daviswhere an order was made for s.1 of DRIPA to be disapplied by the 31stof March 2016, insofar as it is incompatible with Digital Rights Ireland (para 122). This was in the hopes that it would give Parliament sufficient time to come up with a CFR compliant data retention law (para 121).


The government appealedto the Court of Appeal (CoA) which took a radicallydifferent approach maintaining that ‘the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland was not laying down definitive mandatory requirements in relation to retained communications data’ (para 106). But for the sake of caution, the CoA made a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking:

(1) Did the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland intend to lay down mandatory requirements of EU law with which the national legislation of Member States must comply?

(2) Did the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland intend to expand the effect of Articles 7 and/or 8, EU Charter beyond the effect of Article 8 ECHR as established in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR?  

The CoA was not the only national court to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU on matters regarding data retention and the reach of Digital Rights Ireland. On the 4th May 2015, the Force was with Kammarrätten i Stockholm when it asked the CJEU:

Is a general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions, limitations or exceptions for the purpose of combating crime (as described [below under points 1-6]) compatible with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC [the electronic privacy Directive], 1 taking account of Articles 7, 8 and 15(1) of the Charter?

If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, may the retention nevertheless be permitted where:

access by the national authorities to the retained data is determined as [described below under paragraphs 7-24], and

security requirements are regulated as [described below under paragraphs 26-31],

and all relevant data are to be retained for six months, calculated as from the day the communication is ended, and subsequently deleted as [described below under paragraphs 25]?

The way in which the first question in Davis and Watson is asked doesn’t specify whether the general obligation applies to every service provider under the state’s jurisdiction or specific service providers to retain what they individually process. The assumption is the former as ‘all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions’ implies a catch all to the relevant services. The Home Secretary (and indeed the government) may argue that if the CJEU rules in the negative (note that Article 15(1) of the e-Privacy Directive only applies to publically available electronic communications services, thus the justification for retaining data from other services would have to be found in the Data Protection Directive (DPD)) it would mostly have affected cl.78 of the Investigatory Powers Bill (IPB) (currently before Parliament) which would grant the Secretary of State the power to issue retention notices on a telecommunications or any number of operators to retain for e.g. any or all data for 12 if the power in cl.1 of the draft Communications Data Bill (dCDB) had been replicated. The dCDB was a legislative measure introduced in 2012 to allow public authorities to keep up to date with the sophistication of e-Crime. Clause 1 maintained that:

1 Power to ensure or facilitate availability of data
(1) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) ensure that communications data is available to be obtained from telecommunications operators by relevant public authorities in accordance with Part 2, or
(b) otherwise facilitate the availability of communications data to be so obtained from telecommunications operators.
(2) An order under this section may, in particular—
(a) provide for—
(i) the obtaining (whether by collection, generation or otherwise) by telecommunications operators of communications data,
(ii) the processing, retention or destruction by such operators of data so obtained or other data held by such operators.

This measure was, however abandoned because the Liberal Democrats (in the then Coalition Government) did not approve of the far reaching nature of the proposal. In regards to cl.1, it clearly was a general power, as no distinction was made on who the obligation to retain may fall upon, and thus it is submitted that this power is analogous to the power which is the subject of the question being asked of the CJEU. Clause 78(1) of the IPB on the other hand, makes the distinction that a data retention notice may require a telecommunications operator to retain relevant communications data. Though there are two possible conflicts, the first, based on the assumption that the CJEU rules in the negative (to the first question) is cl.78(2)(a) and (b). This gives the Secretary of State the discretion to issue retention notices on any description of operators to retain all or any description of data. This could be considered a general obligation because it could affect all telecommunications operators and then be classed as a general obligation. 

 Secondly, retention ‘without distinction’ or ‘exceptions’ may be important when it comes to traffic data pertaining to journalists, politicians, and the medical and legal professions. But because the reference doesn’t mention specific service providers it cannot be said with certainty how much this would affect cl.78(1) which doesn’t make distinctions or exceptions.

When it comes to limitations on data retention, there is at least one, which was first noted in s.1(5) of DRIPA 2014 which allowed for a 12 month maximum period of retention. This is replicated in cl.78(3) and takes on board the recommendation of the Advocate General’s opinion (AG) in Digital Rights Ireland (para 149).

The President of the CJEU felt it was desirable to combine both preliminary references. The questions of access by both the Swedish and UK courts do not directly affect the cl.78 issuing of retention notices (insofar that it at least doesn’t involve every telecommunications operator) nor does answering whether Article 7 and 8 was intended to extend beyond Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence. The security arrangements are dealt with by cl.81 (whether they are adequate is a different matter) and thus not relevant to the issuing of retention notices.

This, however, proceeds on the assumption that the CJEU will rule in the negative to the Swedish preliminary reference regarding retention being lawful for the purposes of access, because if it does not, cl.78(2)(a) and (b) would not be affected at all. Moreover, the HC in Davis felt that the CJEU believed that data retention genuinely satisfied an objective of general interest (para 44) and that it must be understood to have held that a general retention regime is unlawful unless it is accompanied by an access regime which has sufficiently stringent safeguards to protect citizens' rights set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR (para 70). The CoA was silent on this matter, and therefore for the mean time, it is understood that if the CJEU rules in the positive, cl.78 would not be affected as a matter of EU law.

On the matter of whether the HC or the CoA had interpreted Digital Rights Ireland correctly, it is important to highlight one of the justifications for the CoA conclusions. It maintained in relation to mandatory requirements, that in the opinion of the AG, he was at least, not looking for the Directive to provide detailed regulation (para 77). Yet the CoA failed to mention his conclusions, where it was stated that the DRD was invalid as a result of the absence of sufficient regulation of the guarantees governing access to (by limiting access, if not solely to judicial authorities, at least to independent authorities, or, failing that, by making any request for access subject to review by the judicial authorities or independent authorities and it should have required a case-by-case examination of requests for access in order to limit the data provided to what is strictly necessary (para 127)) the data collected/retained and that the DRD should be suspended until the EU legislature adopts measures necessary to remedy the invalidity, but such measures must be adopted within a reasonable period (para 157-158). So at least in this regard the AG actually supports the stance of the HC (even though no reference was made on this point) and may therefore have had implications for the IPB (which does not require judicial or independent authorisation/review) in relation to access to communications data without a word from the CJEU.


Many thanks to Steve Peers for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Photo credit: gizmondo.com.au